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Abstract  
In multilateral negotiations between nations on problems of global pollution, associated national actions to control 
pollution can be seen as a complex international public good. Such actions are costly and incentives to pass the main 
burden of reduction to other countries therefore exist. The authors show that when governments possess private 
information about national damage costs, signalling through emission levels may occur, and a variety of credible 
actions that manipulates emissions before negotiations (or in-between different stages of negotiation) can be identified.  
In particular, the paper identifies that unilateral actions to reduce emissions can be explained by the desire to credibly 
signal high damage costs, and therefore gives an explanation for unilateral actions as strategic manipulation of 
emissions. These incentives arise whenever pre-agreement actions can influence the final outcome of the negotiations, 
through reduction demands of other countries. 
The implication is that unilateral actions can be seen as a credible move, in situations with private information about 
damage costs, and therefore a rational strategy to get progress in e.g., the climate negotiations. 
Keywords: international environmental problems, reduction levels as signals, private information about damage costs. 
JEL Classification: Q28, H40, D80. 
Introduction 
The climate change negotiations are progressing very 
slowly despite mounting evidence that serious negative 
consequences are unavoidable in case of continued 
inaction (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2006). Therefore, much is 
at stake, and according to Stavin (2011), the climate 
change issue is the ultimate commons problem in the 
twenty-first century. 
Even though an overall objective of not accepting 
global mean temperature to rise more than 2 degrees 
Celsius over the next 100 years (UN, 2010), so far no 
credible policy to reach this target has been established 
(IEA, 2010). The Kyoto protocol, the main inter- 
national agreement to control emissions and which 
control period ends 2012, has so far not found any 
successor. Moreover, in this protocol, none of the 
developing economics have any reduction target. The 
ineffectiveness of the international society to control 
greenhouse gas emissions can be seen from the fact 
that global emissions show no trend of being reduced 
and emission from coal usage in developing countries 
is unprecedented high (IEA, 2012).  
Reasons for the struggling to progress are plentiful, 
and can be attributed both to economic, political and 
distributional/moral issues. Reasons are attributed to 
the free riding issues (Barrett, 2003), the North-South 
issue and environmental justice (Gupta, 2000), and 
issues about collective responsibility and inclusion of 
major developing countries (Walsh el al., 2011). 
Moreover, the climate change issue still is surrounded 
be lots of uncertainty, regarding the amount and timing 
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of damages, and privately held information about 
damages and preferences for the climate change 
issue held by e.g., governments. Such information 
comprises of strategic national interests, lobby 
interests, and the perceived climate risk of the popu- 
lation (Holland et al., 2011; Hulme, 2009). The 
point of departure of our analysis is that real policy 
situations are to a large extent also characterized by 
private information between decision-makers about 
damage cost from pollution, and that countries will 
exploit informational advantages if possible.  
The main contribution of this paper is to show that 
depending on the private information a country 
might have incentive to overinvest in national 
climate polices prior to an agreement. This denotes 
a unilateral action, and in the literature it has been a 
puzzle why unilateral actions have been undertaken. 
Certain countries, and or regions, have undertaken 
reductions (relative to other comparable countries). 
Such unilateral actions are not easy explained. 
Reasons for unilateral actions has been attributed to 
“setting a good example” (Hoel, 1992), or as in 
Lemione and Farrell (2009) to encourage future 
abatement by others, which could mean focusing on 
the promotion of technological innovation and 
diffusion and on providing policy models that others 
could adapt to their own contexts. Our model/ 
incentives are such that unilateral actions might also 
attributed to strategic moves that have the objective 
of improving the bargaining position in expected 
further negotiations. Compared to Hoel’s result, 
where a unilateral action implies less reduction by 
the other countries, in our setting, a credible 
unilateral action is a signal of high damage costs, 
and therefore implies that the other countries reduce 
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more. Note that if signalling succeeds, the analysis 
in this paper shows that the total emission level will 
decrease, and therefore our result is in contrast to 
the findings of Hoel (1992). 
In the context of signalling, the present paper analyzes 
strategic spill-over effects among nations arising from 
observed national policy actions in a pre-negotiation 
phase on global pollution. The focus is on incentives 
by nations to distort national emission levels prior to 
negotiations in order to achieve a more favorable 
position in the final agreement. There have been some 
papers addressing the issue of signalling (Brandt, 
2002; 2004; Rose and Spiegel, 2009; and Jakob and 
Lessmann, 2012), and our present paper extend Brandt 
(2002) by also considering private information about 
damage costs. Finally, Arredondo and Garcia (2011), 
analyze a signalling model where a county leads the 
negotiation in an international environmental agree- 
ment. This country can signal its non-compliance costs 
through committing to the agreement. We do not 
consider the issue of non-compliance but assume that 
countries comply with the final outcome of the 
negotiations. 
Since we are mainly interested in the possibility of 
manipulating pre-agreement emissions level, we 
focus exclusively on the possibility of separating 
equilibrium. That is, in our two-type framework, a 
situation where one type has an incentive, by a 
costly signal, to reveal its true type. Moreover, all 
focus also on first period (pre-agreement) strategic 
incentive. For a given institutional setting, some 
countries will overinvest. This situation arises in 
cases where a country expects that when it reduces 
its emission, this will imply that the other reduce 
sufficiently much in return, believing that the 
signalling country has high damage costs.  
Our result adds to an understanding of action prior 
to an agreement, and a possible explanation to why 
some countries seemingly overinvest in national 
reduction effort in stages before an international 
environmental agreement1. E.g. the EU proposal to 
reduce 30% CO2 can be a signal of high willingness 
to pay for reduction (high damage costs). In order to 
signal true damage costs, extreme positions are 
needed regarding the pre-agreement emissions level. 
Finally, a “pre-agreement” stage might also be a 
first round of a negotiation process, like the Kyoto 
agreement can be seen as a first step towards to 
more demanding second agreement. In this case, the 
achieved emission reduction can also be thought of 
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Harstad (2009) and Beccherle and Tirole (2011) derive incentives for 
countries to lower their investments in abatement technologies to im-
prove their future bargaining position. It is also recognized that coun-
tries might act strategically in international environmental issues is also 
noted by Brandt (2002) and Rose and Spiegel (2009). 
as a signalling device (or investment) for better 
bargaining positions in the next round of negotiations. 
A remarkable lack of analysis of effects of private 
information in relation to international environmental 
agreements can be observed and to our understanding, 
the implications of private information have not 
received the attention it deserves. There are, however, 
few exemptions. The impact of private information on 
global environmental problems and their solutions has 
been addressed by Bac (1996), who includes 
incomplete information about valuation of environ- 
mental damage and Brandt (2002) who includes 
private information about abatement costs. Both 
analyses show that private information leads to 
inefficiency relative to the case of perfect information. 
Finally, Jakob and Lessmann (2012) show that in a 
two-stage game early (delayed) action can act as a 
signal to reveal private information on high (low) 
benefits. The cooperative solution with asymmetric 
information is Pareto-dominated by the outcome with 
perfect information. They also develop a signalling 
game model and analysis the strategic incentives are to 
hide private information about the magnitude of a 
country’s damage. They do, however, not consider the 
existence of a negotiated treaty and how pre-treaty 
action affects the final bargaining outcome.  
Few papers address the issue about strategic 
consideration about how pre-agreement performance 
translates into outcomes of the treaty. An exemption 
is Harstad (2011), who notes that without a climate 
treaty, countries tend to pollute too much and invest 
too little, partly to induce the others to pollute less 
and invest more in the future. The consequence, 
according to Harstad is that short-term agreements on 
emission levels can reduce welfare, since countries 
invest less when they anticipate future negotiations. 
The paper by Beccherle and Tirole (2011) analyzes 
the consequence of the “waiting game” and find 
several strategic incentives to manipulate national 
climate policy such as to affect a country’s benefit in 
future international climate negotiations. Their 
analysis is founded in a full information framework, 
and our model extends their reasoning to a private 
information setting. Essentially the same idea 
underlies our model, but here it is through the 
expectation of the type (damage cost) that pre-
agreement emissions can influence the own and the 
other countries emission targets in the negotiations. 
Buchholz and Peters (2005) note that in a two-stage 
setting, considerable disincentives to be expected at 
stage 1 are to be for a broad class of cost-sharing 
arrangements which generally can be attributed to the 
creation of positive externalities at stage 2, which is 
exactly the kind of incentive structure that underlies 
our model. See also Heitzig et al. (2011), who look at 
self-enforcing strategies to deter free riding in climate 
change negotiations.  
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This paper is organized as follows. The formal model 
is presented in section 1. In section 2 we specify the 
negotiations process and type of agreement. The 
basic incentives that this implies are discussed in 
section 3. Section 4 first defines a sequential and 
separating equilibrium in our setting and hereafter 
presents the finding of the separating equilibrium 
where high damage costs countries signal high 
damage costs by decresing emissions. The equilib- 
rium refinement is explained in section 5. The final 
section concludes the paper. 
1. Model 
First, a model of an abstract international environ- 
mental problem is presented. The set of countries 
affected by and/contributing to this problem is given 
by I = {1, 2, … N}. Each country, denoted i  I emits 
ei > 0 of the polluting substance. For simplicity, 
assume a uniformly mixed pollutant giving rise to a 
global emission problem, such that each country is 
affected by the total emission level e = 6i ei.
We consider two periods, a pre-agreement period and 
a period, where the agreement is settled. For climate 
change, the total emission of GHG in such a period 
adds to the stock of GHG in the atmosphere. The 
emission creates damage, measured by Di(e) (since the 
problem of climate change is a stock pollutant, the 
damage will be the NPV of all future damage costs 
due to this added emission). As usual, we assume that 
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where e-i denotes the emission of all other countries 
than country i1.
A country receives benefit from its emission, measured 
by Bi = Bi (ei). Without any environmental concerns, 
there exists a national optimum of emissions called 
N
ie  defined where   0.i iB ec   We also assume that 
  0.ii
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c  We look at situation where an interior 
solution exists by requiring that   0i iB ec ! for 
N
i ie e  and   0i iB ec  for Ni ie e! .
The net benefit for a country from choosing emission 
level ei is given by: 
NBi (ei; e) = Bi(ei)  Di(e).
We compare a situation where countries do not 
expect any form of international environmental 
agreement (and therefore strategic interactions on 
national emission levels are absent), with a situation 
                                                     
1 The last assumption implies that we will not consider secondary 
effects coming that might arise: when country i changes its emission 
and this affects the other country emission, then this might again have 
an effect on the optimal change of emission of country i.
in which expectations of an agreement among 
countries exist and each country responds optimally 
to this knowledge.  
In the first-mentioned situation a country will choose a 
given emission level derived solely from its own 
damage costs and abatement costs (which again 
depends on consumption and production pattern and 
technologic level), its environmental concern in 
general (reflected in the populations preferences for 
the climate change issue) and trade relations and other 
relations with other countries. This emission level is 
denoted 0ie , and any movement of emission levels 
away from 0ie  therefore implies a cost in that period to 
the country (in terms of lost consumption and 
production opportunity). 
Formally, let 0ie  be the emission level that maximizes 
NBi (ei; e), that is let 
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That is, in this one-period consideration, any change in 
emission away from 0ie  implies additional costs, and 
given the shape of the benefit and damage functions, 
will be increasingly in the distance from 0ie .
Compared to this situation, a country that is faced 
with the prospect of a future negotiated agreement 
on reductions of emission, might consider acting 
strategically to optimize its bargaining position in 
the forefront of the negotiation process. In the 
analysis, we focus on the pre-agreement emission 
level and the information about the countries 
damage costs this emission level might carry.  
Consider the possibility that the choice of emission 
level for country i is guided by strategic considerations 
of interactions among nation. Each country may now 
be willing to impose additional costs on itself in the 
current period by departing emission levels from 0ie if
this result in higher expected benefits in the future 
agreement period. 
Private information is crucial for our analysis. We 
consider the circumstances that private information 
can be present regarding the damage function of a 
country. We assume that damages both can be either 
high or low.  
Formally, define T = {L, H} as a parameter affecting 
the damage from emission. T = L implies low damages 
and T = H implies high damages. To be precise, let the 
type be defined as follows. For any given (feasible) 
individual and total emission, let Di(e; H) > Di(e; L).
The net benefit function can, therefore, be written as:  
NBi(e; T) = Bi(ei) – DBi(e; T).
We define 0 0( )Di ie e T  as the full information non-
strategic emission level given its type is TD(TC). From 
the above definitions of types, we have that 
0 0( ) ( ).i ie L e H!
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Fig. 1. Full information, non-strategic situation 
That is, acountry with high damage costs will – 
without any strategic considerations – have a lower 
emission level than if it has low damage costs. See 
Figure 1 for a graphic illustration of this property.  
2. Specification of the negotiations process/ 
type of agreement 
Before the negotiations take place, each country 
obtains perfect information about its own damage 
costs, whereas it remains uninformed about the 
types of other countries1. Moreover, any country i
holds a common prior probability assessment about 
the value of Ti for alli  I. Let common knowledge 
be assumed regarding the damage types, and we write 
the common prior as pi = prob (Ti = H), and pi < 1. In 
a similar manner, we have prob (Ti = L) = 1 – pi.
After observing Mie , the other countries update their 
beliefs to common posterior beliefs, given by 
   | .M Mi i i ip e prob H eT  
A negotiation on alleviating a major environmental 
problem is a highly complex and dynamic interaction, 
consisting of most of the world’s nations, with highly 
varying economic performance, and emission level. 
Moreover, expected damages are not evenly distri- 
buted among nation. We will make the following 
assumptions, which we consider to represent important 
features of such negotiations: 
i The countries know in advance the “rules of the 
game”, so we are not investigating the design/  
architecture of an international environmental 
agreement (IEA). 
i The solution of the IEA specifies for each 
participant an emission target. 
i The determination of emissions target in the 
agreement is dependent on each country’s pre-
agreement emission. 
i Emission level  Mie

are realized and commonly 
hold beliefs about type of damages are assigned. 
i All the participants comply fully with the 
requirements implies by the IEA. 
As a consequence, all strategic behavior takes place 
in the pre-agreement phase (period 1).  
Next, an emission target is agreed upon. Let a 
solution to an international environmental problem 
(that is, an agreement) specify an emission target 
for each participating country, and denote this 
solution by ^ `1 2, ,..., .S S S SNe e e e  For an individual 
country i,   S S M Mi i i i ie e e eU  such that individual 
emission targets in the agreement depends on the 
vector of posterior beliefs and its pre-agreement 
emission level. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of 
events. 
Fig. 2. Timeline1
                                                     
1 We assume that types are not correlated between countries, that is, knowing own type reveal no information about other type. Brandt (2004) analy-
ses the consequences of correlation for the possibility of making unilateral actions. 
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A large set of agreements (S) exit that has such a 
feature. We will narrow down the class of solution to 
solutions with the following property: We are 
interested in the class of solutions denoted by SG and 
defined as: 
| 0, 0 .
SS
jG i
i i
eeS S
U U
­ ½ww° ° d ® ¾w w° °¯ ¿
The sign of the derivatives in this solution reflects 
natural responses on damage cost arguments in a 
process of negotiation on burden sharing: A country 
credibly claiming high damage costs, roughly 
speaking, increases the seriousness of the 
environmental problem among negotiators, resulting in 
acceptance of higher reductions among all countries1.
Note that e.g. the solution implementing the globally 
optimal emission levels, defined by : jC ii
ji i
DBe
e e
ww  
w w¦
is in SG, as well as the Nash bargaining solution or any 
uniform solution of the type, where 0,Si ie eDc   where 
 1 Dc  is the common percentage reduction level. 
The two-period net benefit function is given by 
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where   S S M Mi i i i ie e e eU  and G is the discount factor. 
3. Basic incentives when damage costs are 
private information 
As a clarification of the underlying incentives of 
countries in this set-up, it is useful to analyze how 
the net benefit to a country changes as a function of 
the common beliefs that other countries hold about 
this country. We do this by looking at the changes in 
posterior beliefs for given emission level of this 
country, and the effect on Sie . Before doing that, a 
useful result is stated below: 
Lemma 1. (incentives to increase own emission in 
an agreement): For any eS  S, where 0,Si ie e i I  
country i prefers an increase in individual emission 
e.g., ( ) 0.
S
i
S
i
NB e
e
w !
w
                                                     
1 The essence here is that we consider solutions with particular 
characteristics where signalling is possible. Other types of arrangements 
could be considered where signalling is not relevant, like a solution 
where each participant reduces a fixed level, independent of country 
characteristics. The class of solutions in focus is rather general and 
encompasses most relevant cases implying that the presented analysis is 
highly relevant for most cases.  
The argument is that for any solution, where
0,Si ie e i I   , it is optimal to increase emission 
unilateral. Given any set of emissions that is the result 
of an agreement, a country would gain individually 
from an increase in its own emission (because 
0S
i ie e ). This result is valid as long as all other 
countries emissions are hold constant for a change in 
S
ie . Our focus here is to derive how the net benefit 
changes with posterior beliefs. 
Private information about damage cost. Differen- 
tiating   , ;T M Mi i i iNB e eU T  with respect to 
 Mi i ieU U yields: 
   
{?}
S ST S S
i i ji i
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ji i i i
dB e dD edNB e e sign
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The sign is ambiguous and this gives us the 
following result: 
1. 0.
T
i
i
dNB
dU
!  Here a country gains from being 
perceived as having high damage costs. 
2. 0.
T
i
i
dNB
dU
d  Here a country does not gain from 
being perceived as having high damage costs. 
The derivations tell that when beliefs that the 
country has high damage costs increase, then in 
bargaining situation all countries emissions will be 
smaller. For country this implies higher costs, given 
lemma 1, due to the decrease in own emission, but 
on the other hand, it benefits from the reduced 
emission of other countries. Which effect is the 
dominating one is not to determine, unless a specific 
IEA and its bargaining process is specified. In this 
analysis we focus solely on the first situation, which 
is the unilateral action case. Situation (2) is the case 
where countries will undertake action to show 
having low damage costs2.
The strategic incentive in situation (1) is to signal 
high damage. In our setting, high damage cost is 
associated with a low first-period emission (relative 
to have low damage costs). More precisely, a low 
damage type would be tempted to invest too much 
in national climate policies to signal high damage 
costs and thereby get a “better” deal in the second-
period agreement.
                                                     
2 The strategic incentive in situation (2), on the other hand, is to signal 
low damage. In our setting, low damage cost is associated with a high 
first-period emission. More precisely, a high damage would be tempted 
to invest too little in national climate policies to signal low damage 
costs and thereby get a “better” deal in the second-period agreement.  
Environmental Economics, Volume 4, Issue 2, 2013
36
In this paper we analyze the case of damage cost 
private information. We look at 0
i
D
T
idNB
dU
!  which 
implies that the sender wants the receiver to believe
abatement damage costs are high, and under private 
information, to be perceived as such a type, the 
country must increase its emission. 
Note that with regards to     , ;M T M Mi i i i i ie NB e eU U T 
is maximized for   1Mi ieU   and minimized for 
  0Mi ieU  .
Therefore, if a sender knows it cannot change 
beliefs (or it is too costly to do so), and given the 
out of equilibrium beliefs specified in section 4, it as 
well can choose the emission level that maximizes 
its net benefit function given that it will be 
perceived as having low damage cost for certain. 
This amounts for country i to maximize 
 ,0;Ti iNB e T . For consistent notation, we denote 
this emission level for  ,0;ie T , and the net benefit 
as  (0; ),0; .Ti iNB e T T
The two-period net benefit function is given by 
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Ultimately, given the structure of the sequential 
separating equilibrium and given the specification of 
the out of equilibrium beliefs, the country in question 
has to make a choice between two situations. It can 
either accept that it will be recognized as having low 
damage costs with certainty, and optimize given that 
situation. Here, the country will choose ei (0, T) and its 
total net benefit will be:  
  1
2
( )
(0, ),0; ( (0, ), )
[ ( (0), (0); )].
T
i i i i
S S
i i i
NB e NB e
NB e e
T T T T
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It can however also reduce first-period emission 
level sufficiently such as being recognized as having 
high damage costs. Denoting the choice of 
emissions as  Mie , the net benefit is given by:  
      1 2,1; ( ( ), ) 1 , 1 ; .T M M S Si i i i i i iNB e NB e NB e eT T T G Tª º  ¬ ¼
Finally, focus in this analysis is on damage cost 
uncertainty. Therefore, to focus exclusively on the 
this, we will employ the following assumption 
throughout the paper. 
Assumption A1: 
         ; ,0 ; ; ,0 ; .M Mi i i i i iB e H B e H H B e L B e L L  
Assumption A1 essentially states that the change in 
benefit from e (0, T) to Mie  is identical for both 
types. This is not a nesseary condition, in the sence 
that our results can still hold if A1 is not satisfied, 
but it makes the results more easy assesable and 
highlights the focus of our analysis on the damage 
costs side. 
4. Sequential equilibrium
We now proceed with the formal signalling model. 
In the signalling game, we have a sender and a 
receiver. The sender is an individual country, sender 
a signal, the pre-emission level, Mie . The receiver is 
the “collective negotiation body”. Consistent with our 
interpretation of the participants to the negotiations, 
that there exists a common understanding about the 
formation of posterior beliefs upon observation of the 
pre-emission levels. 
A collection (of strategies and beliefs) forms a 
separating sequential equilibrium if the following 
conditions are met: 
1. Optimality for country i:
  ^ `ˆ( ) ; .ˆ ,T M Mi i i i iargmax NB e p ee T T
2. Consistency of beliefs: 
i If    ˆ ˆi ie L e Hz then   ˆ ˆ 0i ip e L  and   ˆ ˆ 1.i ip e H  
i If    ^ `ˆ ˆ ˆ,i i ie e H e L  then any  ip e are admissible.  
As already noted and motivated in the introduction, 
we only look at separating equilibrium in this 
analysis. In a separating equilibrium, the two types 
are separated and both are perfectly recognized by 
their true types. To fully describe the set of possible 
separating equilibrium outcomes, we assume that 
out-of-equilibrium signals are followed by the most 
unfavourable beliefs seen from the sender’s point of 
view implying that   0ip e   if    ^ `ˆ ˆ ˆ, .i i ie e L e H
Given these beliefs, a sufficient condition for a 
strategy pair to form a separating equilibrium for 
(0, )Mie e H  is that:
P1:    ,1; (0, ),0; .T M Ti i i iNB e H NB e H Ht
P2:    ,1; (0, ),0; .T M Ti i i iNB e L NB e L L
P1 states that an Mie  exists that will make a high 
damage cost type better off by choosing this emis-
sion level and being perceived as having high dam-
age cost than accepting not to being recognized as 
having high damage costs and maximizing net bene-
fit under that situation. P2 then implies the same is 
not true for the low damage cost type: Even if re-
ceiving the highest possible belief, it will not be 
optimal for the low cost type to choose Mie .
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To describe the set of emissions that are equilibrium 
strategies, it is convenient to define the following 
two sets:  
    ^ `(0, ) | ,1; 0, ,0; ,H M T M Ti i i i i iP e e H NB e H NB e H H  t 
    ^ `(0, ) | ,1; 0, ,0; .L M T M Ti i i i i iP e e H NB e L NB e L L  
Finally, to guarantee that L Hi iP P  is non-empty, 
define the following version of a “single crossing 
property” (SCP), which is explained in details below: 
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We can now state the conditions under which such 
equilibria exists. 
Proposition 1: Separating equilibrium satisfying P1 
and P2 exists with ( )iˆ
L He H P P   and   (ˆ ,0),i L e Le  
given that SCP is satisfied (see Appendix for 
proof). The SCP, which is a version of the generic 
single crossing property (SCP) adjusted to this 
context, states that the total change in damage 
must be higher for the low damage cost type than 
for the high damage costs type. The part 
         0 , 0 ; 1 , 1 ;S S S Si i i i i iD e e H D e e H   measures 
the benefit in terms of lower damage in the second 
period from being recognized as a high damage cost. 
Therefore, the left hand side of the equation measures 
the additional gain that the high cost country receives 
compared to the low damage cost type. Due to the 
slope of the damage-functions, the left hand side is 
positive.     , ; , 0 , ;M M Mi i i i iD e e H D e H e H   measures 
the first period additional damage for country i of the 
higher emission  ,0 Mie H e! . Both brackets on the 
RHS are negative, such the sign of the right hand side 
is ambiguous. Therefore, this condition is needed to 
ensure the existence of the separating equilibrium.  
To provide a graphical explanation of the properties 
of the set of separating equilibrium outcomes, refer 
to Figure 2 and Figure 3.  
Fig. 2. The set of outcomes that satisfies condition P1
Fig. 3. The set of separating equilibrium outcomes 
Not that   0, ,0;Ti iNB e T T  has a fixed positive 
value. Note furhter that 
     0, ,1; 0, ,0;T Ti i i iNB e NB eT T T T! ,
which essentially tells that PH is non-empty. As Mie
is decreased,  ,1;T Mi iNB e L  decresses, until it gets 
lower than   0, ,0; .Ti iNB e T T
Now define the two emission level that lower and 
upper boundary of the set HiP  and 
L
iP , respectively:  
    ^ `
    ^ `
arg (0, ) | ,1; 0, ,0;
arg (0, ) | ,1; 0, ,0; .
,H M T M Ti i i i i i
M T M T
i i i i i
L
i
e
e
e e H NB e H NB e H H
e e H NB e L NB e L L
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A separating equilibrium is therefore guaranteed, as 
long as H Li ie e , as shown in Figure 3. And the 
condition for this is the SCP.  
The reason why it is worthwhile for a high damage 
cost type to separate, is that a reduction of emission 
yields a higher net-benefit. This comes around 
because the high damage type values reductions in 
emissions more than the low damage costs type. 
Therefore, the high damage costs type is willing to 
reduce emission more than the low damage cost type, 
and therefore the high damage costs type will be able 
to reduce emission to a level (still inside HiP ), where 
it is revealed that this emission can only be played by 
an high damage costs type, because such emission 
level are outside LiP : Even if the low damage cost 
type will get the best possible beliefs, it is not 
worthwhile for a low damage costs type to play. 
To summarize, the reason why the high damage 
costs wants to differentiate is that without 
differentiation, it will be recognized as a low 
damage costs type, due to the assumption on out of 
equilibrium beliefs. The SCP is the condition that 
makes it less costly for the high damage cost type to 
reduce emissions than for the low damage cost type. 
Moreover, for the same emissions level, getting a 
higher p (e) always increases net benefit for this 
type, therefore, as shown in Figure 1 and 2, a set of 
emissions exists, where it is profitable to being 
recognized as having high damage cost. Taking 
these observations together, separating equilibrium 
outcomes exit where the high damage cost type 
reduces its emission below e (0, H) while the low 
damage cost type does not reduce its emission.
6. Equilibrium refinements 
Since the set of separating outcomes is large, a 
selection among them is necessary in order to obtain 
a unique prediction of the signalling game. In the 
following this selection is done by use of equilibrium 
refinements1. Such refinements used for signalling 
games are based on the notion of forward induction, 
asserting that rational players in evaluating strategies 
would reason from the beginning of the game-tree by 
using introspection, i.e. by examining which players 
would have an incentive to send possible out-of-
equilibrium messages, and rational players would 
then revise beliefs accordingly. Given it is common 
knowledge among players that everyone engages in 
this introspection process, an implicit communication 
emerges.  
                                                     
1 For more on refinements of signaling games, see e.g., Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1993), Cho and Kreps (1987) and in this context, Brandt (2002).
To see how refinements based on forward induction 
will work, imagine that a player picks a candidate 
equilibrium outcome and reviews the beliefs about 
out-of-equilibrium information sets sustaining this 
outcome. The player then applies a refinement 
criterion that describes what constitutes a reasonable 
belief. If, by taking into account the reasonableness 
of these beliefs and believing that the other players do 
so too, at least one player has an incentive to deviate, 
then this outcome is no longer an equilibrium in the 
refined game. 
The requirement for formation of beliefs applied in 
the present analysis says it should be common 
knowledge among rational players that they never 
play a strategy profile a particular player has no 
incentive to play. We say that a strategy 1ie  is weakly 
dominated by another strategy 2ie  for type T, if, no 
matter what beliefs the uninformed player may have 
after observing the move of the informed player, the 
expected payoff of playing 2ie  always exceeds the 
expected maximum payoff of playing 1ie  for the 
informed player. We present the definitions with 
respect to private information about damage costs. 
Definition of a weakly dominated (WD) strategy: A 
strategy 1ie  is WD by another strategy 
2
ie for type T, if 
 2 1min , ; ) max ( , , ).T Tȡ i i i ȡ iNB e ȡ ș NB e ȡ șt
It appears from the above definition that for 1,ie  to be 
weakly dominated by 2,ie  even in the case where 
2
ie
is followed by the worst possible circumstances from 
the point of view of the informed player, this 
reduction level is still preferred to 1,ie  even when 
1
ie
is followed by the best possible circumstances. Given 
the out of equilibrium beliefs, it follows that in our 
setting 1ie  is weakly dominated by strategy 
2
ie  if 
 2 1, 0; ) ( , 1, ).iT TiNB e ș NB e șt
By invoking the following requirement, we reduce 
the set of separating equilibria in focus. If a strategy 
(signal, emission level) ei is weakly dominated for 
one type, say type T1 but not for the other type, then 
the uninformed players’ belief should place zero 
probability that T1 has sent ei, i.e. ei must be followed 
by posterior beliefs p (T1| ei) = 0. 
Applying this equilibrium selection criteria results in 
a unique prediction concerning a separating 
equilibrium for private information on damage costs. 
Proposition 2: Given L Hi iP P  is non-empty one 
undominated separating equilibrium exists: 
   ˆ 0, ,i ie eL L 
 ˆ .Li ie H e 
Proof see in Appendix. 
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Proposition 2 implies that a rational optimizing 
country with high damage should use the minimum 
resources necessary to distinguish itself from the 
shadow of the low damage cost type. Refer to 
Figure 3, where the unique non-dominated separa- 
ting equilibrium is shown as the highest emission 
level in the set of separating equilibrium outcomes.  
Unilateral action in such model is needed for the 
high damage cost type to reveal its type. Such a type 
is the one that needs to make a costly action to 
reveal its type. Therefore, unilateral action here is 
not motivated by good-hearted behavior and the 
desire to “set a good example” but a costly attempt 
for the one type to being recognized as a particular 
type. Whether or not this is possible are described 
by the conditions in proposition 1. Moreover, if 
these conditions are meet, a rational country would 
avoid overinvestinging in costly signalling, and 
proposition 2 shows the least costly credible signal. 
Finally, note that if signalling succeeds, the total 
emission level will decrease, and therefore our result 
is in contrast to the findings of Hoel (1992).  
Conclusion 
The story of this paper has been that countries meet to 
agree on a new treaty on reducing an international 
environmental problem. The treaty is such that the 
emissions targets depend on the damage costs of 
countries. Higher damage costs imply that all will 
accept more stringent reduction targets. Countries 
have, however, private information about damage 
costs, and therefore need to make a credible move to 
convince the other countries that damages are high. In 
the model, reducing pre-agreement emissions acts as 
such a signal. Such signals are interpreted as unilateral 
action to signal high damage costs. The analysis shows 
that under realistic conditions, and given the 
institutional setting and information structure specified 
in the paper, unilateral action is a credible strategy to 
signal high damage costs. 
Our analysis shades new light in the prospect of 
unilateral actions as a way forward in the impasse of 
the climate negotiations. Our results imply that 
given that the conditions specified in our analysis 
are met, the unilateral moves a rational way of 
improving the achievement in terms of overall 
emissions reduction of a given agreement. Secondly, 
it also points to that significantly effort might be 
necessary in order to act credibly. This could 
explain the EU proposal of a 30% reduction as a 
credible signal that EU government and citizens 
have high (perceived) damage costs and therefore 
push other countries to reduce more themselves.  
However, the question remains whether govern- 
ments, the players in our games, really behave like 
game theory suggests. This issue is also discussed in 
Barrett (2003), and as he notes that, fundamentally, 
we do not know and we will probably never know. 
On the other hand, as also noted by Barrett (2003) 
say that most agreements fail to alter the state 
government significantly, since incentives are not 
supportive for a self-enforcing agreement. Hence, 
the implicit claim here is that countries do act on 
economic incentives.  
Therefore, our intention is to lay out incentives that 
are surrounding negotiations about the control of 
international environmental problems. Once such 
incentives are present, countries will either react on 
these incentives, or believe that others do, creating a 
situation with less trustworthiness. That is why we 
believe that our analysis is important, in order to 
restructure the incentives such that countries 
behavior can be altered such that cooperation can be 
sustained, all the incentives must be identified. 
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. We need to proof that there exists an (0, ),Mi ie e H such that  
P1:    ,1; (0, ),0; ,T M Ti i i iNB e H NB e H Ht
P2:    ,1; (0, ),0; .T M Ti i i iNB e L NB e L L
Rewrite P1 and P2:  
P1 rewritten: 
               
   
; 0, ; 1 ; 0 ; , ; 0, , ;
(1), (1); (0), (0); .
M S S M M M
i i i i i i i i i i i i
S S S S
i i i i i i
B e H B e H H B e H B e H D e e H D e H e H
D e e H D e e H
G
G
 
 
ª º   t  ¬ ¼
ª º ¬ ¼
                  (P3)
P2 rewritten: 
               
         
; 0, ; 1 ; 0 ; , ; 0, , ;
1 , 1 ; 0 , 0 ; .
M S S M M M
i i i i i i i i i i i i
S S S S
i i i i i i
B e L B e L L B e L B e L D e e L D e L e L
D e e L D e e L
G
G
 
 
ª º     ¬ ¼
ª º ¬ ¼
                            (P4) 
Using that benefits are equal for the high damage and the low damage type for equal emissions level and given As-
sumption A1, this implies that the left hand side of P3 and P4 are identical, and can be combined as: 
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, ; 0, , ; 1 , 1 ; 0 , 0 ; , ; 0, , ;
(1), (1); (0), (0); .
M M M S S S S M M M
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
S S S S
i i i i i i
D e e L D e L e L D e e L D e e L D e e H D e H e H
D e e H D e e H
G
G
     
 
ª º   !  ¬ ¼
ª º ¬ ¼
Rewritten:
                   
         
0 , 0 ; 1 , 1 ; 0 , 0 ; 1 , 1 ;
), ; 0, , ; , ; 0, , ; .
S S S S S S S S
i i i i i i i i i i i i
M M M M M M
i i i i i i i i i i
D e e H D e e H D e e L D e e L
D e e H D e H e H D e e L D e L e L
G G   
   
ª º ª º   !¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º ª º!   ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
This is a version of the generic single crossing property (SCP), adjusted to this context. Therefore, the SCP is a suffi-
cient condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium. 
Proof of proposition 2. First, for the L-type, via definition of LiE , all i i
M Le E  are weakly dominated by ei (0, L). On 
the other hand, also via definition of ,i
HE none of i i
M He E are weakly dominated by ei (0, H). Next fix any candidate 
equilibrium  ˆ ,Li iHe e  if the receiver observes a  ˆi iM He e H  , posterior beliefs should be updated to   1Mi ieU  ,
and consequently,  iˆ He  is no longer a sequential equilibrium. This can be done for all  iˆ iLHe e . The only non-
dominated sequential equilibrium is  iˆ iLHe e .
